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Shanghai Rising in  If the Chinese  economy  can
sustain its growth  rate, it will
a Globalizing  W  orld  rival the United  States in a
few decades.  And if Shanghai
can sustain  its preeminence in
Shahid  Yusuf  China,  it is  the East  Asian  city
most  likely  to become  a
global center on a par with
New York,  London, and
Tokyo-if  China can become
open and competitive and if
Shanghai  can greatly improve
in terms of industry, housing,
infrastructure, and quality of
life, among  other things.
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Summary findings
In a globalizing world, cities at or near the apex of the  the path to being a global city, and show how such
international urban hierarchy are among the favored  policies are being implemented.
few-New  York, London, and Tokyo-that  have  As urbanization continues, the authors say, and as
acquired large economic, cultural, and symbolic roles.  information technology and finance related service
Among a handful of regions that aspire to such a role-  activities take on even more importance,  the number of
such as Hong Kong, Miami, and Sao Paulo-Shanghai  regional and global centers could increase, but only if
has reasonable long-term prospects.  they satisfy some exacting requirements. Shanghai's
If the Chinese economy can sustain its growth rate, it  chances, for example, depend on the extent to which
will rival the United States in a few decades. And if  China opens up and on a host of municipal policies-
Shanghai can sustain its preeminence in China, it is the  policies that emphasize Shanghai's industrial strength,
East Asian city most likely to become a global center.  substantially enlarge its base of information technology
Yusuf and Wu explore the makings of a world city,  and producer services, ensure an adequate supply of
identify ingredients essential for that status, indicate  skills, expand available housing and infrastructure
national and municipal policies that may set Shanghai on  enough to meet demand, and improve the quality of life.
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When one thinks of world cities, a handful of names comes immediately to mind: New York,
London, and possibly Tokyo (Friedmann 1998).'  They are classified as world cities because
these large urbanized regions with their dense patterns of interaction are hubs of finance,
communications, international transport, the global corporate sector, the publishing industry,
fashion, and mass culture (Friedmann 1995). These cities are in effect the key nodes in an
increasingly networked global economy (Castells 1996). They owe their position to the "spatial
dispersion" and internationalization of production.  The reorganization of the financial industry
also has led to rapid increases in the already significant concentration of financial activities in
these cities.  Finally, the reconcentration of a considerable component of foreign investment
activity and the formation of an international property market in these cities have further fed the
economic core of high level control and servicing functions (Sassen 1991).
There are significant commercial advantages to becoming a world city with many
regional aspirants such as Hong Kong, Miami, and Sao Paulo, but only a few with reasonable
long-term prospects.  One such candidate is Shanghai (Friedmann 1998, p.34-3 5). In this paper,
we first briefly explore the makings of a world city and identify certain necessary ingredients.
We then examine Shanghai's recent development. Thirdly, we indicate the kinds of policies,
devised by both the national and municipal governments, that would enable Shanghai to graduate
from being a national to a regional-and  possibly, in the distant future, a global hub. And last we
show how such policies are being implemented in Shanghai.
IWorld Cities
We start with the three premier cities-New  York, London, and Tokyo-and  ask what is
distinctive about their past history, economic environment, and geographical location.  How did
they acquire their current status?
All three are the financial and cultural capitals of industrialized countries that are key
players of the world economy.  Taken together, the three countries account for close to half of
global GDP and are hosts to the world's 20 biggest companies (by market capitalization), 22 of
the 50 largest banks, and 24 of the 25 biggest securities firms (Wall Street Journal, Supplement
on World Business, 27 September 1999). Thus, the current size of the economy or-as  is the
case of the U.K.-its  worldwide preponderance in the not too distant past, is one reason for the
salience of these cities.
All three cities enjoy a favored location within their respective countries.  Their
economies are intertwined with and benefit from a rich, diversified, and populous industrial
hinterland.  The neighborhood is both a source of economic strength but also a source of
competitive pressure.  A vast market provides the demand and the aggressive competitors that
spur continuing dynamism.  Although world cities have seen their fortunes fluctuate over the
past 50 years-particularly  New York-on  balance they have pursued policies enabling them to
maintain their historically determined positions at the top of the urban hierarchy (Abu-Lughod
1  999).
All three cities derived a large measure of their past impetus from a broad industrial base
and their role as regional-or  national-transport  hubs.  But in the past three decades, each city
has relied on the growth in demand for producer services (e.g. financial and management
services) and generalized consumer services, while retaining some manufacturing activities-
2Tokyo is ringed by industry.  Finance, other producer services-including  research, insurance,
accounting, and publishing-the  entertainment industry, the medical sector, and education
services are now the principal employers and the drivers of metropolitan prosperity in all three
cities.  The fruitful interaction and growth of the finance and the corporate sectors have been
especially critical to the continuing dominance of these cities.  This has also positioned them to
reap the full benefits of the communications revolution from regional networking and from
globalization (Clarke and Gaile 1998). For instance, New York has become the location of a
"Silicon Valley" comprised of companies specializing in multi-media software, creating Web
sites, and online entertainment and related services.
Among the most remarkable developments during the past two decades is the explosive
increase in computing power and the marrying of this capability with the equally dramatic
expansion in communications capacity (Friedman 1999). The two together have transformed
and globalized the financial system, and they have vastly enlarged international production
networks and helped increase the efficiency of supply chain management.  These networks have
dispersed sequential production processes across national borders so as to reduce costs, improve
market access and enhance competitive advantage. In the process, they have boosted cross-
border trade, which tends to be managed from a few global or regional hubs (World Bank
1  999a).
By being among the first to exploit the commercial opportunities offered by
communications technology, the world cities have strengthened their position as financial hubs.2
In fact, because 80 percent of all international data transmission relates to financial transactions
(Graham 1999), investment in communications technology has enabled these cities to become
the corporate nerve centers of globe-spanning production networks.  Modern communications
3have made it far easier to manage dispersed business operations from centrally located
headquarters that have access to a wide range of vital producer services.  After experimenting
with the dispersal of headquarters to secondary cities, where commercial real estate and housing
costs are lower, most large corporations have found it advantageous to locate in the main urban
centers in order to have full access to the desired mix of services. London, for instance, has the
largest share of international business in areas such as cross-border bank lending, foreign
exchange, and over-the-counter derivatives.  While a trading culture of long standing has
certainly contributed, London also owes its position in these contested markets to a benign
regulatory environment and the quality of professional and support services.
Buttressing all of these attributes is the strength of market institutions and economic
openness in all three countries.  Legal and commercial institutions have provided the foundations
for a thriving financial system and a robust corporate culture.  But it is the openness that has
served as the keystone: providing the traffic in ideas that have contributed to the many faceted
commercial and cultural development of these cities, creating the vibrant milieu that attracts
talented people, and providing workers the incentives to both explore and exploit technological
possibilities.  Recent research has linked openness with the spirit of inquiry, fruitfulness of
research, entrepreneurial drive, the growth of trade, the speed of financial innovation, and
cultural fruitfulness that stimulates change (Landes 1998). World cities draw upon a range of
economic, geographical and institutional strengths, but in addition they rely upon the energies
released by openness.
4The Chinese Context and the Future Role of Shanghai
Shanghai's prospect for acquiring the status of regional hub is undoubtedly tied to
China's future development.  Can China-a  low-income country where about 70 percent of the
population still lives in the rural areas-provide  the conditions for Shanghai to be comparable to
Hong Kong (Enright and others 1997)? Among the East Asian regional centers, Hong Kong will
retain an edge for at least several reasons.  It enjoys the locational benefits that derive from it
being at the intersection of Chinese and foreign social networks mediating the flow of capital.
This is an advantage acquired over more than a century during which social relations were
bolstered by formnal  institutions (Meyer 2000).  Hong Kong is the most centrally located city
relative to the other capitals in East and Southeast Asia. Moreover, if in the future, Asia's
economic center of gravity shifts more to the southeast and the south (the clustering of high-tech
industries in Guongdong and Fujian is a magnet), then cities like Hong Kong and Singapore are
better positioned to service emerging demands (Kuroda 2000, Ochi 1997). The growing
significance of scale and network economies associated with key producer services suggests that
regional hubs will remain few in number.  In addition, there are large gains from the
agglomeration of corporate and service activities in a handful of centers offering ample, multi-
layered opportunities for face-to-face contact, learning, and knowledge spillovers.
But this is not to say that the number of global and regional hubs will remain fixed. New
regional centers could emerge as East Asia continues to develop and urbanize.  As one of the
most rapidly urbanizing countries in the region, China will experience the profound impact of
urbanization on economic growth, the pattern of demand, income distribution, and a range of
services. By one estimate, about a tenth of China's growth since 1980 can be ascribed to the
effects of agglomeration economies.  Moreover, urban Chinese hold 70 percent of the country's
5wealth, command incomes that are three times the rural average, and generate much of the
demand for new consumer goods coming onto the market ("What the Chinese Want," Fortune,
11 October 1999). Furthermore, China's trade prospects, largely determined by urban centers,
and the capacity to generate resources, give it a commnanding  lead over other countries in the
region.
Often called the "crucible of modem China," Shanghai entered the stage of modem
commercial and industrial development in the second half of the 19th  century (Wei 1987).'
During its golden age in the 1920s, with a population over 2 million, Shanghai was "a meeting
ground for people from all countries, a great and a unique city, one of the most remarkable in the
world" (Pott 1928, p.1).  The incursion of western mercantilism into this semi-colonial city and
the establishment of China's first modem institutions of higher learning made it the financial and
cultural center of the Orient.  Ranked as the 7th  largest city in the world in 1936, no modem
Asian city from that period could "match Shanghai's cosmopolitan and sophisticated reputation"
(Yeung 1996, p.2).
Today, with a resident population of 13 million and land area of 6,377 square kilometers
in the metropolitan area, Shanghai is the biggest of three cities-the  two others are Hangzhou
and Wuxi-that  together comprise the principal urban region in China (see Map 1).4  The
metropolitan area, governed by the Shanghai Municipal Government-equivalent  to a provincial
government because of Shanghai's  special administrative status-consists  of 15 urban districts
(10 of them are located in the central city) and 5 suburban counties (see Map 2).  Continuing
efforts of decentralization have offered district governments substantial autonomy in tax
collection, budget allocation, infrastructure provision, and planning.
6Shanghai, with a GDP of $49 billion, has a per capita income of $3,712 (current dollars
in 1999), a highly diversified industrial base responsible for 5.5 percent of national industrial
output, and an expanding services sector (see Table 1) offering agglomeration economies
(Business China, 11 September 2000).  But only a fraction of such economies have been fully
exploited because of the persisting compartmentalization of industrial subsectors and research
facilities, and a resilient legacy of a socialist planning system now being displaced piecemeal by
the market system.  After a decade of industrial restructuring, municipal authorities are paying
closer attention to the development of high-tech products and six manufacturing subsectors-
automobiles, telecommunications, power station equipment, steel, petrochemicals, and home
appliances (Shanghai Star, 28 May 1999).5 At the same time, the share of services has begun
rising steeply since 1993 and now accounts for 48 percent of municipal GDP.
Entering the 21 st  century, Shanghai is a city competing aggressively for the mantle of
China's premier metropolis in the face of competition from an established center-Hong  Kong,
and other aspirants such as Beijing.  Its share of the nation's GDP is almost twice that of Beijing,
and its growth (averaging 9.5 percent in 1999-2000) is the highest of any city in China.  In
Shanghai's  favor is the support and incentives it has received from the central government.  The
attention given to Shanghai represented in part the attempt by the center to promote development
in the northern part of the country to balance the rapid advances taking place in the southeastern
region (Ochi 1997). Pudong, a newly developed area on the eastern side of the city, provides
Shanghai with an abundance of commercial and industrial space supported by good physical
infrastructure, all constructed since the early 1  990s (see Wu 2000).  Moreover, Shanghai has
invested heavily in transport facilities and the latest fiber optics based on communications
7technology so essential for the growth of local producer services and for integrating with the
international business community (Wu and Wong 1997).
Around Shanghai and extending westward along the Yangtze River Valley is one of the
two most prosperous economic hinterlands in China with an urban population of 200 million and
6 a GDP of nearly $300 billion (1995 dollars at market prices).  The southeastern region,
comprised of Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta, has registered equivalent growth rates and
has a superior transport and communication facilities.  But the size of the Yangtze Basin
economy, its momentum during the 1  990s, and its contiguity to the Qingdao-Yantai-Jinan region
are certainly impressive.  When we look into the future, the pattern of development in the
Yangtze Basin, the productivity of the diversified agricultural economy, the vast scale of rural
industrial activities, and the speed with which transport and communications infrastructure are
being built up, all suggest that this region competes strongly with other parts of the country. 7
Preeminence in a national context, however, is only one of several attributes of a regional
or global hub.  Actions enabling Shanghai to acquire the status initially of a regional center
would need to encompass at least two strands: the first involves greater openness, comparable to
that enjoyed by Hong Kong. This is primarily in the hands of the central government.  The
second calls for municipal policies to enhance Shanghai's competitiveness as a metropolitan
area.
Pathways to the World City-Greater  Openness
Economic liberalization
Relative to many other countries, China remains a closed society where central and
subnational governments regulate and limit contacts with foreigners, control movement into and
8out of the country, regulate Internet traffic, and take a minimalist view of individual rights vis-a-
vis the state. 8 The political system is firmly in the grip of the Communist Party.  And although
the Shanghai municipality, with the status of a province, enjoys substantial fiscal and
administrative autonomy, it is subject to the same strictures as the rest of the country regarding
relations with the outside world.
By containing links with the rest of the world, the Chinese authorities make it harder for
Shanghai to capitalize on foreign direct investment (FDI) in infrastructure building, international
production networking, and the growth of producer services. Although Shanghai's rapid
development over the past decade has contributed to its continued national dominance, key
elements of national policy have kept Shanghai from moving closer to the ranks of cities that can
claim to be regional hubs.  China's limited attractiveness for the international business
conmmunity,  which affects the prospects of its cities, was underlined by an Economist Survey (7
March 1998, p. 114). Hong Kong had a score of 8.5 out of 10 during the period 1992-96, ahead
of Britain, the Netherlands, Singapore, Canada, and the United States. China was not among the
top 30 countries.
Openness has many dimensions, including trade, the legal framework, finance, and
culture.  China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will result in a significant
liberalization of trade through the adoption of rules and incentive mechanisms shared by other
members. 9 It will involve China directly in international governance associated with trade and
related issues.  It is also likely to result in a far-reaching dismantling of barriers to trade in
manufacturing, agricultural products, and many kinds of services and far greater penetration of
foreign entities in the financial sector, telecommunications, and other areas.10 These would
9accelerate the reform of the state enterprise sector currently being downsized through closure,
merger, or privatization.
Improved communications with other countries is another dimension of the move
towards openness.  This already is being pursued with great vigor through heavy investments in
telecommunications, amounting to $400 billion between 1994 and 2000, which has provided
fixed and mobile telephone service to more than 155 million users." 1 The number of Internet
users is expected to reach 33 million in 2003, as against 8.9 million in 1999 and 16.9 million in
June 2000.  12 For this investment and the inter-linkages it provides to yield their full returns,
domestic rules and laws will have to evolve to recognize individual freedoms to use the
burgeoning channels of communication.  13
This leads to a third and related aspect of openness, which is the framework of
commercial laws and regulations governing business dealings and financial transactions.
Starting in the mid-I 980s, China has been gradually building a legal infrastructure, training
lawyers, assimilating laws, and instituting legal procedures that are increasingly a common
currency worldwide.  Bu, the nature of Chinese legal and regulatory practices, as well as the
approach to enforcing regulations, still differs markedly from that of more open industrialized
countries.  For example, there is legislation providing redress where administrative power is
misused, but only under certain conditions when the government is involved, and no redress is
available when the Party is involved. The courts cannot challenge the right of the police to
impose administrative punishments and send people to jail without a trial.14 This can result in
uncertainty, inhibits business dealings, and raises transaction costs, especially for foreigners.
China's vast potential market tempts foreign companies and financial houses and is
responsible for cumulative foreign investment in China of about $325 billion (committed
10amount) by the end of 1999.15 But the lack of transparency and the problems of coping with
complex local regulations are a serious disincentive. The persistence of high transaction costs
resulted in a reappraisal of business opportunities in China by many foreign corporations and a
slowdown of FDI in 1999 ("China Survey," Financial Times, 1 October 1999). 6  Hence,
narrowing the institutional gulf in legal and regulatory matters between China and other
countries will be a key aspect of greater openness.
China remains largely segregated from international financial markets.  Earlier plans to
liberalize transactions on the capital account were interrupted by the East Asian crisis of 1997-98
that battered five countries in the region but left China largely unscathed.  In the immediate
aftermath of the crisis it was thought that China avoided succumbing to the crisis because it
deferred the deregulation of the capital account until it had built up adequate supervisory
capability and thereby contained the inflow of short term and, portfolio capital.  Malaysia's
experience with controls on capital outflow also lent credence to this line of thinking.  However,
closer analysis of the entire crisis episode and of the use of capital account controls not just in
East Asia but also in Latin America suggests that the story is much more complex and capital
controls may have had much less of bearing on vulnerability than the state of the financial
systems in the crisis-hit East Asian economies and their neighbors.17
The experience of East Asia and Latin America seems to have established some new
findings and reaffirmed old lessons: there is no significant relationship between the openness of
the capital account and economic volatility (Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 1999). However, the
capital account should be fully liberalized only after achieving macroeconomic stability,
ensuring that the banking system is strong and competitive and putting in place an effective
regulatory system (Cooper 1999). Where countries delay needed banking reforms and use this as
11a reason to defer capital account liberalization, urban development suffers, the deepening of
financial markets is significantly slowed and much capital is allocated inefficiently. Producer
services develop less rapidly and financial repression also affects the cost and access of small
businesses to capital.  All of these are likely to influence longer-term growth (Levine 1997).
A major challenge for China during the medium term is to strengthen the financial system
(Newfarmer and Liu 1998). As markets become more sophisticated, new derivative instruments
appear, and trade contacts continue to expand, restraining capital outflow is likely to prove
extremely difficult and even containing inflows would pose problems.  Thus capital controls are
likely to inflict transactions costs, and raise borrowing costs for small and medium scale
enterprises without achieving many tangible benefits in terms of protection from major shocks
(Edwards 1999).  If they reduce the pace of banking reform they could involve a substantial
waste of resources.18
Strengthening market institutions
Shanghai is embarked on the road to becoming a financial center, but it lags far behind
Hong Kong.  So far the central government and the municipal authorities have taken only the
first few steps by creating some of the physical infrastructure and inviting international financial
entities of all kinds to establish offices in the city.  Commercial banks, investment and brokerage
houses, insurance firms, other market makers, and telecommunications companies have
responded by establishing footholds in the city.'9 In all, 52 foreign banks had established offices
or commercial operations by the end of 1998. But thus far, the authorities have restricted retail
banking activities, securities trading, and insurance. Foreign banks can only make local their
currency loans to multinationals and joint venture partners, and raise capital for Chinese
12companies only in offshore markets.  Many other elements must be put in place-for  example,
permitting foreign intermediaries to compete for local deposits and services such as credit cards
and home mortgages-before  Shanghai becomes even a regional crossroads for the international
financial community (Chowdhury 2000).20
One of these is the lowering, as is proposed under the soon to be adopted WTO rules, of
barriers to trade-a  step that would promote trade, sustain growth, and lead to a continuing
decline in poverty.  Second is the opening of China's capital account, which, along with full
convertibility, would permit the freer flow of capital in and out of the country. A third is a
framework of rules and laws governing financial and other entities that delineate and enforce
rights in a transparent and predictable manner, especially those pertaining to contracts,
intellectual property, bankruptcy procedures, and foreclosure.  Fourth is a regulatory framework
to monitor activities, build the institutions that will ensure stable market functioning and induce
innovations conducive to growth as well as efficiency. Fifth, is the reform of financial entities to
enhance their autonomy and efficiency and enable them to compete against foreign
organizations, a development that would permit a gradual dismantling of the many curbs on the
activities of foreign firns,  including investment in Chinese banks. In 1999, the nonperforming
loans (NPLs) of the four major state banks amounted to at least a fifth of their loan portfolios.
Furthermore, as state controlled banks channel over 75 percent of bank credit to state enterprises,
half of which have been making losses during 1998-99, the percentage of NPLs is likely to
increase.  Return on assets in the banking system was less than 0.2 percent in 1999.21
The final element relates to the continuing development and deepening of the financial
and insurance markets, a process that has been ongoing since the early 1990s. 2 2 Markets for
stocks, other financial instruments, and foreign exchange are now functioning in China, along
13with adequate mechanisms for clearing transactions and settling payments.  Over 1,000 state
enterprises are listed on either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen stock exchanges by 2000 and
market capitalization is approaching 4 trillion yuan ($484 billion). 23 But the insurance
industry is still woefully underdeveloped.  The institutional base created must evolve much
further before China can attain parity with other industrializing countries not to mention the
advanced economies.  Shanghai has a head start in the sphere of financial market development in
China, which is meaningful in a national context but not yet in regional terms. 24
Pathways to the World City-Competitiveness  and Livability
While the critical policies determining economic openness will be largely decided by the
central government, and the prosperity of Shanghai's hinterland will be a function of policies
pursued by a host of entities, Shanghai's municipal authorities also have a large role to play in
enhancing the city's competitiveness and quality of life.  This calls for action in a number of
areas, building on a variety of ongoing initiatives.  Shanghai is active in each of these areas, but
it faces difficult choices and many steps may involve complex negotiations with the central
government as well as neighboring provinces.  This section outlines some of the progress
Shanghai has made and likely hurdles it will face, including:
*  A coordinated development of transport, housing, and infrastructure to minimize
congestion and improve urban livability, through organizational streamlining and the use of
new financial instruments.
*  Industrial consolidation accompanied by land use policies inducing a shift of industry away
from the core areas and permitting mixed commercial and residential use of prime urban
land.
14Taking measures to ensure an adequate supply of entrepreneurship, skills, and labor from
within the municipality and through migration.
Renewing urban infrastructure
Shanghai's determination to renew itself can best be seen in its effort to overhaul the
city's aging infrastructure since the early 1990s. 25 Unmet demand is shrinking as Shanghai
makes progress in virtually every infrastructure service (see Table 2).  Improvements are
particularly rapid in road construction, park expansion, and wastewater treatment.  Shanghai now
treats 30 percent of its wastewater, compared to an average level of about 7 percent in all
Chinese cities.  A number of large infrastructure projects have been completed, such as three
bridges and two tunnels across the Huangpu River, an inner ring road, elevated north-south and
east-west throughways, and two new subway lines. 26 Furthermore, the first phase of a new light
rail system is expected to be operational in 2000.  The city recently unveiled a 20-year blueprint
for the construction of 11 subway lines, seven light rail lines, and three suburban railways.  So by
2020, the city will have a total of 325 kilometers of subway and 136 kilometers of light rail
(Shanghai Daily, 19 June 2000).
Enhancing its external linkages has been a key objective of infrastructure building in
Shanghai. Most of all, the new international airport that opened in September 1999 marks a
significant step in the city's long-term goal to become an aviation hub in the Asia and Pacific
region. 27 It will be connected to the planned Beijing-Shanghai expressway by a proposed high-
speed railway supplemented by high-speed ferries running from a terminal adjacent to the airport
to nearby ports in Zhejiang province (Shanghai Star, 19 March 1999).  Foreign airlines have
responded to the city's rising significance as a business center and the growth in airport capacity
15by increasing the volume of service.  In 1999, several new, non-stop flights were added,
including KLM Royal Dutch Airlines to Amsterdam, Austrian Airlines to Vienna, and China
Eastern Airlines to Japan's Fukushima.  Shanghai now has non-stop flights reaching most of the
world's important urban centers.  Rapidly increasing Internet usage also relates to the export
orientation of Shanghai-based enterprises and the steadily improving quality of the telecoms
facilities is helping integrate Shanghai with the world economy.  Greater broadband access and
the use of mobile technology, as in Singapore and Japan, will enhance the utility of the Internet
although this will require resolving some thorny issues regarding standards, technology, and
links with households and freedom of access. 28
Investment in infrastructure services has increased steadily, with a greater emphasis on
city streets, sewerage systems, and other municipal works (see Table 3).  The infrastructure
sector now receives the level of attention from the municipal government it deserves and
accounts for about one-tenth of Shanghai's total fixed asset investment. 29 Much of Shanghai's
success in renewing infrastructure can be attributed to a comprehensive program of resource
mobilization and expenditure management beginning in 1990 (Yusuf and Wu 1997).
First, municipal authorities have increased user charges for some infrastructure services
including bus fares, gas supplies, water, wastewater discharge, and municipal sanitation services.
Second, Shanghai has begun to raise funds by leasing land, in the process attracting a large
volume of FDI into real estate development including commercial and apartment complexes
catering to foreign companies (Wu 2000).  Shanghai's population density, its relative prosperity,
and the nature of commercial development now underway, means that real estate in the
municipality is extremely valuable.  This has induced many state enterprises to move their
factories out of the downtown areas and lease the land for commercial purposes ("China's  Land
16Grab," Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 April 2000).  Third, the city has set up separate
transport and energy funds in municipal revenue collection, guaranteeing much of the funding
for the two sectors.  Last, since 1986 Shanghai has tapped into the international market to lure
direct investment and build-operate-transfer schemes. 30 The issuing of domestic construction
bonds also has been growing steadily, capturing the high level of household savings.
In addition, progress in infrastructure building would not have been possible without
large-scale organizational reforms.  As a part of Shanghai's reform to unify financial and
administrative responsibilities for municipal bureaus, the Shanghai Urban Construction
Investment and Development Company was formed in 1992 to mobilize, allocate, and manage
funds for urban construction.  Displaying an impressive record of achievement in infrastructure
financing since its creation, this state-owned company has employed a wide range of financing
mechanisms, particularly through such non-state channels as construction bonds, the stock
market, and service concessions.  It has entered into concessions with non-state enterprises to
operate the bridges and tunnels across the Huangpu River. It also has established a number of
subordinate entities, mainly in charge of water supply, which are listed on the Shanghai Stock
Market (Wu 1999b). Available official information shows that in 1995 and 1996, funds
mobilized by the company accounted for about 76 percent and 90 percent, respectively, of
Shanghai's total urban infrastructure revenue.
Another important element of Shanghai's institutional reform is greater managerial
autonomy for public utility agencies.  To the extent feasible, municipal service departments have
been given full responsibility for planning, investment, operations, and maintenance. These
departments also are adopting an independent cost-accounting system to facilitate sector
management and financing.  For instance, a sewerage company has been created to maintain the
17newly constructed sewerage system.  A major reform materialized in 2000 when the city
consolidated water and urban transportation functions-scattered  across up to nine different
municipal agencies in the past-into  two bureaus that would have full authorities over decision-
making, operations and maintenance (China Daily, 15 May 2000).  Other avenues, which would
allow enterprises serving as contractors to provide selected services, are under consideration and
some bus services are already under concession. The city is also commercializing some of its
waste disposal business and a company from neighboring Jiangsu Province has won the contract
to collect garbage, ajob  shunned by many locals (Shanghai Star, 24 July 1998).
Substantial progress has been made in raising the supply of better quality housing since
the early 1990s through heavy investment (increasing from 2.6 billion yuan in 1990 to 43.3
billion in 1997, Shanghai Statistical Bureau 1998). The city is replacing 3.6 million square
meters of endangered structures and shanty apartments, mostly in the old central city.  The
accessibility of housing to the average family is on the rise as a result of reforms, among the
most comprehensive in the nation (Wu 1999a). The city, employers, and employees all
contribute through a nevvly  established public reserve fund to finance housing purchases over
time.  Since 1998, all banks have been able to supply mortgages to qualified homebuyers on
behalf of the public reserve fund.  In addition to new home purchases, many people have bought
property or use rights to the homes they were assigned under the old welfare housing system and
some also trade such rights on the secondary housing market to acquire better housing. 3'
The creation of a mortgage finance market, the assignment of leasehold rights, and the
permission to trade in the secondary market are important steps in housing reform.  But the
coverage remains fairly restricted, the residential property market is insufficiently differentiated
and collateral requirements enforced by banks are strict, while the credit provided is relatively
18short term ("China Survey," Financial Times, 1 October 1999). Further reforms will be required
to ensure that the large volume of public sector housing is properly commercialized by granting
property/lease rights to current residents and the remaining publicly-owned welfare housing is
adequately maintained. 32
Further institutional reform also will be needed to minimize political pressures on
infrastructure providers, giving them sufficient autonomy to collect fees, make price adjustments,
undertake service planning and have incentives to assume full financial responsibility.  Public
agencies still have a long way to go in devising appropriate commercial rules and encouraging
private participation and competition.  Permitting majority private shareholders in infrastructure
construction or wholly private infrastructure facilities is unlikely in the foreseeable future unless
underwritten by build-operate-transfer schemes.  And the private sector may be hesitant to incur
greater responsibility and risk as investment in infrastructure provision is usually for a significant
duration and the period of implementation can affect investment return.  Private interests,
therefore, may be better utilized in the areas of infrastructure operation and maintenance, with
public transportation, waste disposal, and sanitation services as prime candidates.
Creating new space ofproduction for  industrial consolidation and investment promotion
Helping Shanghai to plant industrial roots a century ago, foreign investment is now a
major force pushing the city ahead with systematic change.  By 1998, the stock of utilized
foreign investment reached US$3 8.6 billion, of which about US$6.3 billion involved technology
imports (Shanghai Statistical Bureau 1999). FDI volume has grown rapidly, accounting for
about three-quarters of all international investment in 1998. Because of its industrial depth,
modernizing infrastructure, and skilled workforce, Shanghai has outpaced other Chinese cities in
19the race to attract FDI. 33 A return on capital investment, 2 percent higher than the national
average (8 percent) is an additional inducement.  The city is also courting more investors from
the United States and Japan, while experiencing a decline of FDI originated in Hong Kong (see
Table 4).  Funding from overseas sources has been instrumental in the building of the city's new
subway system, new industrial districts, and the hotel and other facilities needed to attract large
numbers of businesses and tourists (Wu 1999b, Wu 2000).  Shanghai's strategic location and
external linkages, on the other hand, also lure domestic finns to invest in the city and use it as a
springboard to the world market.
Reflecting the city's drive to rejuvenate its mature industrial base, manufacturing sectors
are attracting more foreign investors.  As of July 2000, 254 of the Fortune 500 companies have
invested or established offices here (China Daily, 18 July 2000), and the chief examples are
Alcatel, Volkswagen, General Motors, NEC, DuPont, and IBM. This could be a prelude to the
shift of some regional headquarters functions to the city.  The largest gains in output value are
registered in such rising industries as telecommunications equipment, integrated circuits and
computers, bio-medical technologies, and new materials (Shanghai Statistical Bureau 1999).
Shanghai is likely to regain its industrial edge and competitiveness through these industries as
products from its traditional light industries (e.g. electronics, textiles, and garment) have been
losing ground in domestic markets.  Efforts also are taken to revamp the textile and garments
industries through attracting more brand name fashions from overseas, and a series of
international fashion exhibitions has been organized for this purpose.
Since the early 1990s, Shanghai's has been actively promoting investment in services,
with the backing of the central government.  Foreign insurers have been allowed to operate only
in Shanghai, and all nine foreign banks currently licensed to deal in the domestic currency are in
20Shanghai's  Pudong New Area (Asahi Evening News, 4 June 1999). The traditional face of the
city's food markets and department stores also is being altered by international companies.
Deals jointly  financed by funds from Hong Kong and Taiwan are helping Shanghai to rejuvenate
its motion picture industry, which gave the city the title of Hollywood of China in the 1930s.34
FDI in the tertiary sector, however, appears to be stabilizing although the real estate sectors
continue to attract a substantial amount (see Table 4).
To appeal to foreign investment and international businesses, several new industrial
districts (often called Economic and Technology Development Zones, ETDZ) have been created
since 1984.  Special regulations comparable to those offered by other coastal provinces have
been extended to these districts: tax exemptions for enterprises doing business with foreign
companies for a limited duration, tax holidays for new factories set up with foreign investment,
and exemption from import-duty for production materials used by these facilities (Wu 1999a).
To ensure broad-based future development, the city is also strengthening the industrial, science,
and technology capabilities of the new districts.  The existing stock of FDI and the quality of
services is gradually strengthening Shanghai's bargaining position vis-a-vis foreign companies,
enabling it to press for joint ventures, local contracting and technology transfer (Yeung and Li
1999).
The Pudong New Area is the focus of the effort to produce for the international market.
The designated space is a triangular area adjacent to and east of the central city, stretching from
the east bank of the Huangpu River to the southwest of the Yangtze estuary and covering over
522 square kilometers.  Planned for a three-phase development, Pudong is designed to relieve the
spatial pressure on old Shanghai.  It already contains China's largest free trade zone, a fully
operational export processing zone, a high-technology development zone, 35 the new
21administrative center for the Shanghai municipal government, and a large number of new
residential communities.  The modem facilities-and  the concessions-in  Pudong have already
attracted many businesses.  Baoshan Steel Corporuljion,  China's largest steel conglomerate, has
put up a facility. The largest department store in Asia has been built here, with investment from
the Japanese retail giant Yaohan.  And a T, S$2 bliion  General Motors facility has been turning
out Buick cars, the second major joint auwn  production line in Shanghai.
Pudong also provides Shanghai with a new central business district (CBD) that can house
a variety of business activities and, most importantly, financial and business services that are the
backbone of other major world cities.  The traditional commercial centers of the city are formed
by two avenues, Nanjing Road and Huaihai Road, which are already approaching saturation as
redevelopment proceeds in downtown.  The building of Pudong's  Lujiazui CBD-  an area of 1.7
square kilometers on the east bank of the Huangpu River-has  been guided by the long-term
ambitions of the city and facilitated by an international consultative planning process in which
experts from France, Britain, Italy, and Japan participated (Olds 1997). A host of financial
institutions, corporate headquarters, as well as commercial and cultural activities are being
housed there, including the Shanghai Stock Market and about a dozen foreign banks-the  only
area in the country where foreign banks are allowed to have regular business operations by the
central government.
Competing with Pudong are the Minhang ETDZ, Hongqiao ETDZ, and Caohejing High-
Tech Park, all located to the west of the central city.  With more specialized functions, these
zones have sought niches in such modern industries as electronics, medical equipment,
computers, telecommunications, bioengineering, aerospace and precision instruments, and new
construction materials.  Although these zones have been more successful than past efforts of
22creating satellite towns, a large proportion of Shanghai's industrial base still remains in the
central city districts (Gaubatz 1999). This is in contrast with Beijing where industrial activities
are being concentrated in the outer suburbs.
Additional measures need to be put in place to consolidate and relocate industry out of
downtown locations.  Apart from being a source of congestion and environmental pollution,
these factories contribute to the inefficiency of land use.  In any case, many are highly inefficient
operations that deserve to be shut down. To solve problems associated with fragmented
industrial land use, Shanghai has largely relied on relocating factories from the central city to the
new industrial districts available for expansion.  Between 1991 and 1998, about 12,000 work
units as well as 400,000 households were moved from downtown to the city's outskirts
(Shanghai Daily, 1 September 2000).
The rationalization of land use and the utilization of the new industrial estates, however,
will not proceed smoothly unless the prevailing system of land allocation and charges is
changed.  Land lease awards need to be made through auctions with standard lease terms and
payments rather than being assigned through negotiation.  Land values, therefore, are determined
through competitive and transparent auctions and not by public authorities.  Evidence from a few
cities, including Shanghai, suggests that central city factories could fully finance redevelopment
if they were permitted to sell their land to real estate development corporations through
competitive bidding procedures (Dowall 1993).
Caution needs to be exercised as the new districts will inevitably compete with the central
city for resources.  It may be wise to prioritize their development as competition among them is
not necessarily conducive to growth.  The challenge also lies in pursuing specialization without
foregoing the benefit of agglomeration.  Shanghai's development funds will be insufficient if
23they are spread too widely and may be wasted in premature over-building.  This is already
evident in parts of Pudong where many new residential and commercial buildings remain vacant,
largely the result of significant mismatches between supply and demand. 36
Shanghai's  property development is yet to be regulated by either a functioning land
market or sound planning. 37 Many foreign investors appear not to be disturbed by the high
vacancy rates in Shanghai's office and luxury housing markets, largely due to the belief that
more overseas and provincial funds flowing into the city will continue to push the economy
forward.  Enthusiasm of city officials to benefit from selling land rights and to lure foreign
investment has only made the bubble expand.  The use of real estate business as the key to the
rebuilding of the increasingly depressed domestic market (seen in the late 1  990s), as promoted
by China's  Premier Zhu Rongji, also makes it difficult to put a break to new housing
construction.  Municipal authorities have tried to play down the vacancy problem as the natural
cycle of property market, although the approval of new office projects was suspended in mid-
1999 (Shanghai Star, 7 July 1999). It is clear that the creation of more commercial space may
subject Shanghai to an increasing degree of market speculation, similar to that seen in urban
centers of Southeast Asia during the 1997-98 crisis.  Then in mid-2000 in a bold step to prevent
such a possibility, the city enacted a new regulation that would deprive all district and county
governments of the approval right of land leasing.  Instead the Shanghai Municipal Housing and
Land Administration will have the sole authority, and stop the leasing approval of land for such
projects as shopping malls, entertainment centers, golf courses, and grade A villas and office
buildings (Shanghai Star, 4 August 2000).
24Labor market prospects
While policy, infrastructure, and investment are certainly important, successful cities
draw their energy from entrepreneurial dynamism and the quality of the workforce.  In an
economy with accelerating technological innovations and rising specialized service functions,
the labor force needs good basic education and skills, and market institutions should permit a
high degree of flexibility.  Measures to ensure an adequate supply of entrepreneurship, skills, and
labor will be one of Shanghai's biggest challenges as its state enterprises move away from the
practice of providing the workforce with tenured employment and guaranteed pensions along
with health, housing, and other benefits.
The foremost challenge is relocating workers displaced by the large-scale closure and
divestiture of state enterprises, which is particularly difficult for middle-aged workers close to
retirement in the city's core industries like textiles. Labor use in these enterprises is highly
compartmentalized with workers trained in a narrow specialization. Therefore, the retraining of
workers, either for reassignment within their enterprises in response to production shifts or to
facilitate employment after closure, greatly influences internal and external labor mobility.  For
the moment, the city has opted for the absorption of surplus workers in low skill service
operations where job prospects have multiplied and retraining is minimal.  Specifically, these
workers find employment in retail, repair and maintenance works, grounds maintenance,
household services, and cleaning services.
Shanghai's workers command a wider range of skills compared to other industrial cities
in China, but the share of professional and technical personnel lags far behind key global centers.
Shanghai has begun to address this educational gap and two measures have been taken to attract
25new, young  talent into the city. Enrollment  for local students  in universities  and colleges,  as well
as in vocational  schools,  has been increased  substantially.38  Shanghai  also has relaxed
restrictions  on enterprises  in hiring  personnel  with college  or graduate  education  from other  parts
of China by allowing  them more quotas  for urban household  registration. In particular,  the city
welcomes  students  who are returning  from overseas,  either  temporarily  or permanently,  to open
new businesses.
The rapidly aging  population  presents  Shanghai  with another  difficult  challenge. Those
over age 65 accounted  for 12.5  percent  of the total population  in 1996 and 13.3  percent  in 1998,
and on current  trends  are expected  to account  for 26 percent in the year  2020 (Shanghai  Star, 5
June 1998). Shanghai  now ranks uppermost  among  Chinese  cities in aging  population,  about  20
years ahead of the national  trend. It is perhaps  the only city in China that is witnessing  a
phenomenon  similar  to that occurring  in countries  with substantially  higher income  levels. A
growing  number  of retirees demand  a better  pensions,  housing,  and medical  benefits.
The significant  growth  in the share  of old age cohorts  in the population  is partly the result
of a low birth  rate. As the one-child  family  planning  policy  has been fairly effective  in large
cities, natural  growth of the population  was only about 0.35  percent in 1990  and -0.23 percent in
1996 (Shanghai  Academy  of Social  Sciences  1997). At the same time, life expectancy  for men
has risen from 71 years to 75 years,  and for women from 74 years  to 79 years  between 1969  and
1998  in Shanghai  (Liberation  Daily, 29 July 1999). Much of the growth of the resident
population  between 1985  and 1995 can be traced  to the return of Shanghai-born  youth, displaced
during  the Cultural  Revolution  (1966-1976).
The projected  decline  in the city's workforce  can be offset  by an increasing  volume  of
migrant  workers,  as is the case  elsewhere  in the world. 39 Shanghai  is already relying  on
26temporary migration (without change of household registration) as an alternative to permanent
migration (with household registration change) in meeting its labor force needs.  About 3 million
temporary migrants and transients, largely permitted by relaxed migration policies, are now
working and living in metropolitan Shanghai, most of whom do not have urban status and are
therefore not counted as part of the resident population. Nevertheless, many temporary migrants
stay in the city for a prolonged period of time and often with their families.40 Without urban
household registration, these temporary migrants are denied access to free education, subsidized
housing, and pensions.  The impact can be severe for migrant families with children.  When
families of large size migrate together, income disparities between urban residents and migrants
also increase (World Bank 1997).
Accommodating migrants and attracting those with the required skills are likely to be a
long-term issue facing municipal authorities. This will require a change in the provision of
adequate housing as well as services.  A new type of housing is becoming available in some
areas of Shanghai-migrant  housing complexes managed by sub-district and township agencies.
Some involve reuse of old temporary housing while others are new residential compounds built
by large enterprises.  Yet enterprise provided dormitories and private housing rentals are still the
most common housing choices available to migrants, in which they live in conditions
considerably worse than local residents.
To sustain, let alone improve, the quality of its workforce while preventing social
stratification and urban poverty, Shanghai will have to tackle the laws governing migration.
Migrant workers and entrepreneurs will provide much of the human impetus for the city's future
development.  Housing reform, for instance, can help improve migrants' quality of life and
prevent slum formation.  Specifically, migrants can be allowed to participate in the secondary
27housing market, where apartments are more affordable.  Migrants also need greater access to
jobs and educational facilities previously open to local residents only.  Of course, these measures
do not fully address the costs and hardship migrants bear as a result of the household registration
system, whose reform will have to be initiated by the central government.  It is clear that the
current practice of linking household registration and the provision of urban services is likely to
widen the rural-urban divide and social differentiation within cities.  To properly respond to the
need for migration requires that this linkage be discontinued.
Conclusion
In a globalizing world, cities at or near the apex of the international urban hierarchy are
among the favored few that have acquired large economic, cultural, and symbolic roles.  As
urbanization continues and service activities-especially  information technology (IT) and
finance related-take  on an even greater prominence, the number of regional and global centers
could increase, but only if they satisfy some exacting requirements.  Shanghai, located in one of
the most rapidly developing parts of the world, may well be one of them.  If the Chinese
economy can sustain its growth rate, it will rival the U.S. in a few decades.  And if Shanghai is
able to retain its preeminence in the Chinese context, then it is likely to be the East Asian city
with the best prospect of becoming a global center.
However, Shanghai's  chances depend on the extent to which China "opens up."41  It also
rests on a host of municipal policies that focus the municipality's industrial strength,
substantially enlarge its base of IT and producer services, ensure an adequate supply of skills,
expand the availability of housing and infrastructure services in line with demand, and improve
the quality of life.  Shanghai is in the vanguard of change in a number of areas, but, as we have
28indicated, the tempo of reforms needs to be sustained. In particular, it needs to nurture an
internationally competitive services sector by dint of reform and by attracting FDI.  The
emphasis on industry, housing, and infrastructure will certainly have payoffs, but so long as the
volume and quality of services lag, Shanghai will have difficulty making it into the ranks of
regional hubs.  Openness, combined with policy measures that induce competitiveness, is most
likely to lead to outcomes that are in Shanghai's long-term interests.
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* We wish to thank Josef Gugler,  Yue-man  Yeung,  Xiangming  Chen, Deepak  Bhattasali,  and participants
in a National  Research  Council  workshop  for their insightful  comments.
I Friedmann  defines  world city as "a class of cities that play a leading  role in the spatial  articulation  of the
global economic  system or designate  a dimension  of all cities that in varying  measure  are integrated
with this system" (Friedmann  1998,  p.26.). Sassen  (1991) uses  the term global  city to describe  the very
same cities - New York, London  and Tokyo. She views  these  cities as nodal  points for the
coordination  of processes  and sites of production. Following  the stock market  collapse in Tokyo in the
early 1990s,  the metropolitan  administration  switched  from the objective  of a global city to one of
becoming  a lifestyle  city (Gordon 1999).
2 Because  Tokyo has lagged  behind  with its reforms, its role  as a financial  hub is far less significant. On
financial  reform in Japan, see Hayes 2000.
3 Many academic  volumes  have been devoted  to Shanghai's  past, chief  among  which are Murphy 1953,
Howe 1981,  Wei 1987,  Johnson 1995,  Goodman 1995,  and Lu 1999.
4 This population  figure includes  only registered  permanent  residents;  it is the same  throughout  the text
unless otherwise  noted. An estimated  3 million  temporary  migrants,  largely  from rural China, also
reside in Shanghai. The other major  urban regions  are Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan  and Hong  Kong-
Guangzhou-Shenzhen  (Wang 1998  p.2 65).
5 Shanghai  is the leading producer  of many  items in each of these  categories,  accounting  for nearly half
of all sewing  machines produced  and close  to a third of power  generating  equipment  (Yeung 1999).
6 Yeung (1999)  notes that the Yangtzi  Basin accounts  for a third of China's population  and 40 percent of
GDP.
7 Shanghai  is China's largest seaport,  accounting  for 18 percent  of total cargo. The total volume  of traffic
handled  by the Shanghai  Port Authority  in 1998  was 90.5 million  tons, of which 21 million tons was
coal and 27.6  million  tons was containers. Bulk traffic-coal  and fertilizers  declined  through the 1990s
(Shanghai  Statistical  Bureau 1999).
8 Notwithstanding  the fact that total trade is in the region  of $420 billion (2000),  making  China  the ninth
largest trading  nation with one of the highest  B2B  transactions  in the world (Pearson  2000).
9 See Martin  and others 1999. Recent  work  by Frankel  and Roemer  (1999)  provides  added  support  for
the relationship  between  trade and increase  in incomes. They  find that a one percent increase  in the
ratio of trade to GDP raises per capita incomes  by one half percent  by stimulating  factor accumulation
and productivity. The relationship  between  trade and growth  has been noted  in cross country  studies  by
Sachs  and Warner  (1995 and 1997). On China  see Yu 2000,  Li and Zhai 2000, Yu 1998  and "The Big
Lie of Global  Inequality,"  Financial  Times 9 February  2000.
10  "China  weighs lifting curbs on foreign  firms," Wall Street  Journal, 10 January  2000; "China  to speed
up financial  reform  before  joining WTO,"  Financial  Times,  21 January  2000.
11  "Surf's up," Far Eastern  Economic  Review,  4 March 1999.  China  surpassed  Japan in the first quarter
of 2000 as the country  with the largest  number  of cell phone users-51.7  million  (China  Business,  11
September  2000). The number  of landlines  exceeded  100  million in June 2000 (Hartford  2000).
12 "China's Risky  Leap Forward,"  Financial  Times, 12  August 1999;  "China  Survey,"  Financial  Times, I
October 1999;  and Hartford (2000). The number  of Internet  users in Shanghai  rose from 3.3 thousand
in 1996  to 102  thousand in 1998. And the number  of long distance  telephone  lines (not all local phone
lines can dial long-distance  directly)  increased  from 59,000  to 84,000  over the same period  (Shanghai
Statistical  Bureau 1999,  p. 244.)
13 Attempts  by the Chinese  government  to control  the use of the internet  through closer  regulation  and
the fostering  of state owned  websites  would  only slow  the process  of opening  ("Beijing  set to step-up
curbs on Internet," Financial  Times,  22 March  2000, and Kennedy  2000).
14 "China:  The Legal Environment,"  Oxford  Analytica,  29 July 1998;  "China: Rule by Law," Oxford
Analytica,  25 October 1999.
3015 "Turning Point," Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 August 2000.
16 During the first eight months of 1999, contracted foreign direct investment fell by 20 percent over the
previous year to $25.3 billion ("China: Global Engagement," Oxford Analytica, 21 December 1999).
However, inflows rose in 2000 and are expected to reach $45 billion (China Business, 17 July 2000).
17 Poorly managed, and lightly supervised banks in some of the East Asian countries invested their
resources without due analysis of risk often in sectors favored by the government, in affiliated
businesses or in real estate.  This gradually increased the proportion of non-performing assets and
implicitly enlarged the contingent liabilities of the government. As awareness of this banking fragility
became more widespread and doubts grew as to the ability of governments to rescue the banking
sector, a silent flight of capital commenced.  A succession of events then precipitated a full-fledged
crisis.  Even China was not immune to this silent flight, reflected in the country's  large errors and
omissions in the balance-of-payment accounts.
18 Nonetheless, with capital flowing back into the East Asia region and financial reform still in its early
stages, the risks from bubbles and a resurgence of problems remain.  Capital flows increased sixfold
from 1998 to 1999, reaching $39 billion, and are projected to rise to $59 billion in 2000.  See "Flood
of Capital seen as Recovery Threat," South China Morning Post, 21 March 2000.
19 "Alcatel office to be launched in Shanghai," Wall Street Journal, 18 January 2000.
20  With accession to the WTO, competition in financial services could increase if China reforms its
banking sector and levels the playing field (Harner 2000).
21 Steinfeld "China Survey," Financial Times, 1 October 1999; "Mission Critical," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 9 September 1999; and World Bank 1999b.
22 Development of the domestic financial market will be aided by a series of government moves, among
which is the raising of the ceilings on stock market investments by insurance companies from 5 to 10
percent.  This will increase the volume of liquidity available to finance new share issues ("China to
boost liquidity in share market," Financial Times,21 March 2000).
23 It is projected that 2000 firms will be listed by 2010 and market capitalization could reach  13 trillion
yuan.  "China Equity Development," Oxford Analytica, 17 August 2000.
24 In fact, with two major financial centers already in the region-Tokyo  and Hong Kong, there may not
be a role for a third center of equivalent scale, especially given the advances in communications
favoring a few large nodes linked to many smaller ones in a hierarchical system (Coyle 1997).
25 China devotes 10 percent of GDP to infrastructure and housing development, with housing alone
accounting for 6 percent of GDP.  This has resulted in an oversupply of housing in the medium and
higher price range.
26 Shanghai's Narada Group, a private company, is one of a number of new firms involved in building
and operating toll roads in the metropolitan area ("Roads to Riches," Far Eastern Economic Review,
23 September 1999).
27 The airport opened with a 4,000-meter runway and one terminal building, with an annual capacity of
handling 20 million passengers and 0.75 million tons of freight.  When completed eventually with the
planned four runways, the airport will be able to handle 70-80 million passengers and 5 million tons of
cargo every year (Shanghai Star, 19 March 1999).
28 Kennedy 2000; "China: Equity Market Development," Oxford Analytica, 17 August 2000.
29 Total fixed asset investment includes investment in capital construction, technical upgrading and
transformation, investment by urban and rural collective units, real estate investment, investment by
urban and rural residents in private housing construction, and other investment of ownership units
(Shanghai Statistical Bureau 1999).
30 See "Water business is hot as more cities decide to tap private sector," Wall Street Journal, 9
November 1998.
31 In the first half of 1999, more than 20,000 families engaged in such trading (Shanghai Star, 30 July
1999).
3132 In 1999, Shanghai terminated the welfare housing system that had been allocating housing to all urban
residents at nominal rent levels, in either work units housing or municipal public housing.  However,
qualified low-income residents can still acquire such housing in the future, and many existing
residents are not forced to purchase property/lease rights to their housing.
33 For instance, FDI inflows to Shanghai in 1998 were $3.64 billion as against $2.06 billion in Beijing
and $2.52 billion in Tianjin (Shanghai Statistical Bureau 1999).
34 Recently a powerful animation company has been set up, with dreams of becoming China's Disney
and subsequent creation of the nation's first higher-leaming animation program ("China sets sights on
animation," Variety, 3 January 2000).
35 A Software Park is being developed jointly by the Ministry of Information Industry and the city
government.
36 By the first quarter of 1999, for instance, grade A office space in Pudong had a vacancy rate reaching
65 percent.  Shanghai Star, 28 May 1999.
37 It is not clear whether, in a capitalist system, a functioning land market should be the sole mechanism
through which urban land is allocated (see Haila 1999).
38 The city has seen an increase in annual enrollment for universities from 19,000 in 1991-1995 to 30,000
in 1996-2000, for adult continuing education from 10,000 to 18,000, and for vocational schools from
22,000 to 35,000.  See Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1997.
39 Projections by several local research institutions show that, because of the aging population, the
volume of resident workforce (age 15-59) will begin to decline after 2005 and by about 2 million in
2030.  See Shixun Gui, "Shanghai's  Population Trends and Social Security Pensions" (Shanghai: East
China Normal University, mimeo, 1999).
40 For instance, the city's  1997 Floating Population Survey reports that close to a half million of migrants
have lived in the city for over five years (Zhang and others 1998). So far the city allows migrants to
stay for a prolonged period as long as they properly maintain and renew temporary residence permits.
Periodically, the Public Security Bureau conducts random checkup and deports those without work
and residence permits back to their origin.
41 An important influence will be the significant degree of foreign ownership of assets resulting from
FDI.  This could approach a third of total assets in five to six years.
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37Table 1. Indices of Gross Domestic Product in Shanghai (1952=100)
Year  GDP  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  Transport &  Wholesale, retail  Banking &  Real
sector  sector  sector  communications  &  food  services  insurance  estate
1985  1,596.6  244.2  2,602.9  715.0  1,833.1  391.3  3,076.7  1,154.0
1986  1,666.9  243.8  2,707.0  757.9  1,906.4  394.0  3,544.4  1,065.1
1987  1,791.9  237.2  2,907.3  825.4  1,973.1  397.9  4,274.5  1,175.9
1988  1,972.9  248.2  3,180.6  929.4  2,085.6  461.2  5,185.0  1,198.2
1989  2,032.1  248.9  3,231.5  995.4  2,164.9  465.8  6,548.7  1,286.9
1990  2,103.2  259.6  3,322.0  1,048.2  2,437.7  476.2  6,961.3  1,020.5
1991  2,252.5  260.6  3,547.9  1,137.3  2,627.8  547.0  7,135.3  1,575.7
1992  2,585.9  261.6  4,158.1  1,273.8  2,869.6  643.9  7,784.6  1,905.0
1993  2,971.2  254.5  4,852.5  1,441.9  3,079.1  727.0  9,193.6  2,133.6
1994  3,396.1  261.9  5,541.6  1,669.7  3,300.8  803.3  11,924.1  2,656.3
1995  3,875.0  278.7  6,361.8  1,888.4  3,565.4  921.4  12,568.0  7,190.6
1996  4,378.8  292.6  7,067.9  2,224.5  4,007.5  1,029.2  16,313.3  8,923.5
1997  4,934.9  304.9  7,817.1  2,618.2  4,344.1  1,227.8  20,587.4  10,288.8
1998  5,433.3  311.6  8,458.1  2,992.6  4,717.7  1,355.5  23,016.7  12,696.4
Source:  Shanghai  Statistical  Bureau,  1999.
38Table 2.  Improvements in Shanghai's Infrastructure Services, 1991 and 1998
1991  1998
Per capita paved road (square meters)  2.3  5.0
Per capita open space (square meters)  1.1  3.0
Per capita living space (square meters)  6.7  9.7
Capacity for treating wastewater (million tons/day)  0.4  1.9
Access to gas (percent)  62.0  91.5*
Per capita annual domestic water consumption (tons)  71.2  104.6*
Wastewater treated (percent)  7.6  30.2*
* 1996  figures.
Source:  Shanghai  Statistical  Bureau, 1997  and 1999;  Shanghai  Construction  Commission,  1997.
Table 3  Investment in Shanghai's Urban Infrastructure (billions of yuan), 1981-98
1981  1986  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Electricpover  0.35  0.57  1.98  1.97  2.58  4.16  5.73  7.76  8.02  8.96
Transportation  0.24  0.66  1.45  1.50  3.18  3.68  2.59  6.97  8.51  10.88
Postal  &telecovnunications  0.04  0.18  0.46  0.64  1.47  3.59  5.34  7.76  6.10  7.27
Public  utilities  0.06  0.57  0.92  1.26  3.79  2.68  3.50  4.83  5.22  5.84
unicipal  wks  0.09  0.50  1.34  3.06  5.78  9.71  10.21 10.57  13.43 20.20
Total  0.78  2.48  6.14  8.43  16.79 23.82 27.38  37.88 41.29  53.14
Asperetage ofTlFA  14.4  16.9  23.8  23.6  25.7  21.2  17.1  19.4  20.9  27.0
Note: TIFA,  total investment  in fixed assets. Public  utilities  include  water supply  and drainage,
residential  gas and heating supply,  and public transportation.  Municipal  works include  city streets,
bridges, tunnels,  sewerage,  parks, sanitation  and waste management,  and flood control.
Source:  Shanghai  Statistical  Bureau, 1999.
39Table 4.  Utilized Foreign Investment in Shanghai, 1995-1998 (US$million)
1995  1996  1997  1998
Amount  Percent  Amount Percent  Amount  Percent  Amount  Percent
Foreign direct investment [1]  3250.0  100.0  4715.8  100.0  4808.0  100.0  3637.9  100.0
Joint ventures  1753.9  54.0  2561.7  54.3  2095.0  43.6  1486.4  40.9
Cooperative operation  1088.0  33.5  1179.0  25.0  784.0  16.3  480.6  13.2
Wholly foreign-owned  363.4  11.2  721.3  15.3  1920.0  39.9  1274.0  35.0
Primary sector  2.6  0.1  3.2  0.1  1.0  0.0  4.0  0.1
Secondary sector  1475.9  45.4  2520.0  53.4  2707.5  56.3  2297.6  63.2
Tertiary sector  1771.5  54.5  2192.6  46.5  2099.8  43.7  1336.3  36.7
Manufacturing  1450.6  44.6  2458.4  52.1  2695.3  56.1  2270.7  62.4
Real estate  681.8  21.0  1052.9  22.3  1325.9  27.6  923.4  25.4
Social services  489.9  15.1  281.0  6.0  225.9  4.7  224.2  6.2
Wholesale, retail and food services  539.4  16.6  570.5  12.1  222.8  4.6  52.0  1.4
Transport and communications  25.6  0.8  8.5  0.2  16.8  0.3  18.6  0.5
HongKong  1894.0  58.3  2232.0  47.3  1756.1  36.5  1026.1  28.2
United States  364.0  11.2  687.6  14.6  855.7  17.8  864.8  23.8
Japan  237.6  7.3  625.9  13.3  461.1  9.6  374.4  10.3
United Kingdom  108.6  3.3  204.7  4.3  155.8  3.2  132.8  3.7
Taiwan  177.5  5.5  327.5  6.9  161.7  3.4  127.6  3.5
Singapore  78.0  2.4  153.7  3.3  372.9  7.8  116.0  3.2
Foreign loans [2]  2033.2  2789.0  1537.0  1178.0
Other  foreign  investment [3]  15.0  5.1  0.0  0.0
Allforeign  investment [1]+[2]+  [3]  5298.1  7510.0  6345.0  4816.0
Projects with technical import  674.5  1015.7  695.5  1332.9
Sources: Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 1996-1999.
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